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"An Image of Man ..." Working Notes on 
Charles Olson's Concept of Person Robert Creeley 
TALKING TO A G AT HE RING of student writers (S.U.N.Y. 
College at Cortland, N.Y., October 20, 1967) Olson again tried to make 
clear that he was not involved in some self-aggrandizement and that The 
Maximus Poems were not therefore a backdrop for himself as quondam 
hero. He then read "Maximus of Gloucester" (The Maximus Poems, 
Volume Three, p. 101)?the date for which he notes as "Friday Novem 
ber 5th/ 1965": 
Only my written word 
Tve sacrificed every thing, including sex and woman 
?or lost them?to this attempt to acquire complete 
concentration . . . 
It is not I, 
even if the life appeared 
biographical. The only interesting thing 




of man, "The nobleness, and the arete/' 
(Later: myself (like my father, in the picture, a shadow) 
on the rock 
One might expect to hear this plea from two other American poets, who 
are felt, I think reasonably, to be Olson's predecessors, Ezra Pound and 
William Carlos Williams. Paradoxically T. S. Eliot, whom Olson uses 
as a 
significant antagonist in "ABCs," is not usually presumed to be 
personally present in his longer poems, although he said of "The Waste 
land" that it was, after all, "the relief of a personal and wholly insig 
nificant grouse against life. ..." In contrast, Whitman's "Song of Myself" 
is read as an intimate relation with the factual poet himself, although 
the reader discovers remarkably little about Whitman literally. What 
Whitman depends on is the authenticity of the personal, that the fact 
on an T 'feels' this or that emotion confounds all 
'authority' of an 
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otherwise abstract or general order. Both Pound and Williams make use 
of this fact. As Olson writes (Mayan Letters, Cape, London, 1968, pp. 26 
if.), "Ez's epic solves problem by his ego: his single emotion breaks all 
down to his equals or inferiors ..." and, of Williams, "Bill HAS an 
emotional system which is capable of extensions and comprehensions 
the ego-system (the Old Deal, Ez as Cento Man, here dates) is not. 
It is ironic that what I call so loosely 'the personal' is both our subject 
(which only an ego can determine as existing) and our object, "having 
to do with a material object as distinguished from a mental concept, idea, 
or belief. . . ."It must be that Olson's own physical size (he was six foot 
seven) made the latter situation of person most insistent. One of his last 
wry points in hospital was upon his own pleasure that 'the fundament 
stayed as put as the firmament. . . .' The body did not go away, in short, 
forever lost among the stars. 
Returning to Eliot, Olson again qualifies him in the second part of 
"Projective Verse" (Human Universe and Other Essays, edited Donald 
Allen, Grove, 1967)?and it is the second part of this essay he felt 
especially valuable, as against the first part, which proved the most read: 
?it is because Eliot has stayed inside the non-projective that 
he fails as a dramatist?that his root is the mind alone, and 
a scholastic mind at that (no high intelletto despite his apparent 
clarities)?and that, in his listenings he has stayed there where 
the ear and the mind are, has only gone from his fine ear 
outward rather than, as I say a projective poet will, down 
through the workings of his own throat to that place where 
breath comes from, where breath has its beginnings, where 
drama has to come from, where, the coincidence is, all act 
springs. 
What Olson means by the statement, "down through the workings of 
his own throat to that place where breath comes from 
. . . 
," can be 




example, on the first page: 
the data of depth sensibility/the 'body' of us as 
object which spontaneously or of its own order 
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produces experience of, 'depth' Viz 
SENSIBILITY WITHIN THE ORGANISM 
BY MOVEMENT OF ITS OWN TISSUES 
It's to the point that Olson had wanted to compose a "Book of the 
Body," which would be an extensive study and report of the material, 
presumably, the "Proprioception" text so brilliantly graphs and/or out 
lines. This preoccupation is very frequently evident in his work, as in 
the short, initial statement, "The Resistance" ("It is his body that is his 
answer, his body intact and fought for, the absolute of his organism in 
its 
simplest terms, this structure evolved by nature, repeated in each act 
of birth, the animal man . . . ," HU, p. 47) or, at more length, the 
proposal of human event found in "Human Universe" 
(HU, p. 10): 
What happens at the skin is more like than different from 
what happens within. The process of image (to be more exact 
about transposition than the "soul" allows or than the analysts 
do with their tricky "symbol-maker") cannot be understood 
by separation from the stuff it works on. Here again, as 
throughout experience, the law remains, form is not isolated 
from content. The error of all other metaphysic is descriptive, 
is the profound error that Heisenberg had the intelligence to 
admit in his principle that a thing can be measured in its mass 
only by arbitrarily assuming a stopping of its motion, or in 
its motion only by neglecting, for the moment of its measur 
ing, its mass. And either way you are failing to get what you 
are after?so far as a human being goes, his life. There is only 
one thing you can do about the kinetic, re-enact it. Which 
is why the man said, he who possesses rhythm possesses the 
universe. And why art is the only twin life has?its only valid 
metaphysic. Art does not seek to describe but to enact. And 
if man is once more to possess intent in his life, and to take 
up the responsibility implicit in his life, he has to compre 
hend his own process as intact, from outside, by way of his 
skin, in, and by his own powers of conversion, out again. 
Recognize, then, that surely one insistent human dilemma is lodged in 
the abstraction which consciousness permits, i/that marvellous function 
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be 
employed only to gain an "objective correlative" to that very exis 
tence any one of us is fact of. Olson's respect for the mushroom, 
specifically for the experiments which Timothy Leary was conducting 
in the early 60s, has obvious bearing. Talking to an informal group at 
William Gratwick's home in Pavilion, N.Y., November 16, 1963, he 
emphasized the apparent fact that hallucinogenic agents, LSD in particu 
lar, "... puts you on your own autonomie nervous system?as against 
the motor." 
And certainly the human race has been so bereft of its auto 
nomie system for so long that you can practically talk that 
we're green. In fact I would think almost that you have to 
talk about the species today as green, individually and socially. 
Not all?how you say it?the way we tend to talk from our 
progressive or evolutionary or developmental past as though 
we've now got to take this step. It's not some step that you 
take easily, or that even to take the step, if you stop to think 
about it. You're just who you are; what you do, if it's any 
good, is true; and you are capable of being alive because of 
love. I mean it's about as simple?it's like those simplicities 
operate. And that's it. Well, it's not so easy to come to believe 
as absolutes, imperatives and universals. In fact, on the con 
trary, we've been encouraged to think there is some universal, 
absolute or imperative we seem to be missing out on. But the 
autonomie thing is very crucial. 
(Olson, #3, pp. 19-20) 
In the same discussion he speaks of the triad of politics, theology, and 
epistemology, the three intensive-extensive patternings of human 'con 
tent,' and of how crucial it is that they be examined in present situation. 
Because once there is the human belief, "the idea that there is such a 
thing as knowledge 
. . . ("invented by a man named Plato. Episteme is 
his invention and it's one of the most dangerous inventions in the world 
. . 
." (O, #3, p. 13), the dislocation of mind and body is immediate. 
George Butterick 's "notes from class, 15 September 1964" make a 
further clarification of Olson's emphasis: 
Olson began his Modern Poetry course at Buffalo the follow 
ing fall with the same triad, which he identified as "Augus 
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tinian," saying that it was "dogmatically true." He related 
the term politics, or the Greek physics 'nature,' to "necessity"; 
epistemology, or nous 'mind', to "possibility"; and religon, or 
theos 'God', to the "imaginable." 
(O, p. 54, footnote 14) 
"Soul" also can be an obvious distraction, but only if you let it get away 
from you so to speak. I find, somewhat sadly, that the OED's first listing 
of this word's definition, "The principle of life in man or animals; 
animate existence," is noted as obsolete, while the second definition not 
only survives but defines our problem entirely: "The principle of thought 
and action in man, commonly regarded as an entity distinct from the 
body ..." (OED, p. 2927). One can make a simple measure of the 
dangers inherent in abstraction by recognizing how removed the valued 
factor in existence, the soul, has become from that which it inhabits, 
the body?and, equally the life, the process, of which it is literal 
instance. Nonetheless the dilemma is clear, apart from this particular 
resolution: how is that which we are, as 
"thought," "action," "soul," 
what we also are as in Olson's phrase, "what gets 'buried,' like, the flesh 
. . . bones, muscles, ligaments, etc., what 
one uses, literally, 
to get about 
etc. ..." But, he says, "the soul is proprioceptive . . . the 'body' itself 
as, by movement of its own tissues, giving the data of, depth . . . that 
one's life is informed from and by one's own literal body. . . . that this 
mid-thing between 
. . . that this is 'central,' what is?in this 1/2 of the 
picture?what they call the SOUL, the intermediary, the intervening 
thing, the interruptor, the resistor. The self") 
The gain: to have a third term, so that movement 
or action is 'home,' Neither the Unconscious 
nor Projection . . . have a home unless the DEPTH 
implicit in physical being?built-in space 
time 
specifies, and moving (by movement of 'its 
own')?is asserted, or found out as such . . . 
The 'soul' then is 
equally 'physical.' Is the self* 
its own is such, 'corpus.' Or?to levy the gain psychology 
*See "The Soul is a body as long as God's" ?Olson, #4, p. 7. 
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perception from 1900, or 1885, did supply until it didn't 
(date? 1948?)?the three terms wld be: 
surface (senses) projection 
cavity (organs?here read 'archetypes') 
unconscious the body itself?consciousness: 
implicit accuracy, from its own energy as a state 
of implicit motion. 
Identity, therefore (the universe is one) is supplied; and the 
abstract-primitive character of the real (asserted) 
is 
'placed' projection is discrimination (of the 
object from the subject) and the unconscious is 
the universe flowing-in, inside. 
(AP, pp. 18-19) 
Again and again one finds in Olson's thinking an insistence upon the 
authority of one's own life as initial. Whether it be "that all start up/to 
the eye and soul/as though it had never/happened before" or "That a 
man's life/(his, anyway) is what there is/that tradition is//at least is 
where I find it,/how I got to/what I say," (Letter 11, p. 48) there is no 
otherwise, or where. 
It would be of point, clearly, to consider the way in which "history" 
is present in The Maximus Poems, and to say again, as he did constantly, 
that Olson 
. . . would be an historian as Herodotus was, looking 
for oneself for the evidence of 
what is said: Altham says 
Winslow 
was at Cape Ann in April, 
1624 
(TMP, p. 101) 
Characteristically, one is tempted to type, in the third line, "was" for 
"is," and "said" for "says"?but it is as much to the point that the 
present is "historical," as that there is, therefore, an "historical present." 
Or as answer to the question I had then asked, literally, "what is 
"history"?" Olson's answer, the poem "Place; & Names": 
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a place as term in the order of creation 
& thus useful as a function of that equation 
example, that the "Place Where the Horse-Sacrificers Go" 
of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad is worth more than 
a 
metropolis?or, for that matter, any moral 
concept, even a metaphysical one 
and that this is so 
for physical & experimental reasons of 
the philosphia perennis, or Isness 
of cosmos beyond those philosophies 
or 
religious or moral systems of 
rule, thus giving factors of naming 
?nominative power?& landschaft 
experience (geography) which stay truer 
to 
space-time than personalities 
or biographies of such terms as specific 
cities or persons, as well as the inadequacy 
to the order of creation of anything except 
names?including possibly mathematics (?) 
the crucialness being that these places or names 
be as parts of the body, common, & capable 
therefore of having cells which can decant 
total experience?no selection 
other than one which is 
capable 
of this commonness (permanently 
duplicating) will work 
"Story" in other words as if not superior 
at least equal to ultimate mathematical 
language?perhaps superior because of 
cell-ness (?) In any case history 
(as to be understood by Duncan's Law 
to mean a) histology & b) story) 
applies here, in this equational way 
& severely at the complementarity of 
cosmos (complementary to individual 
or private) and not to cities or 
events in the way it has, in 
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a mistaken secondary way, been 
understood 
Duncan had written him (18 Dec. 61): "But "history"??couldn't we 
throw that word out and establish histology: the tissue and structure, 
weaving, of what [it] is we know. 
story: what we know from the questions we asked. This thing is made 
up, or an answer?but is, also, the only thing we knew to answer :oracle 
or 
sphinx-demand 
That: we do hold by histology and story having to do with one gnosis. 
And the art, the story, seeks out histology or lapses into the cult-sure 
. . . 
" 
(O, 4, p. 45, n.2) 
It's also to the point to remember, that Olson's favorite definition of the 
word 
"history" was, finally, John Smith's (despite, as he remarked, its 
curious faintness): "History is the memory of time ..." In an autobio 
graphical note ("The Present Is Prologue"), published 1955, he writes: 
There are only two live pasts?your own (and that hugely 
included your parents), and the one other we don't yet have 
the vocabulary for, because the West has stayed so ignorant, 
and the East has lived off the old fat too long. I can invoke 
it by saying, the mythological, but it's too soft. What I mean 
is that foundling which lies as surely in the phenomenologi 
cal 
'raging apart' as these queer parents rage in us. 
I have spent most of my life seeking out and putting down 
the 'Laws' of these two pasts, to the degree I am permitted 
to see them (instead of the boring historical and evolutionary 
one which the West has been so busy about since Thucydides) 
simply because I have found them in the present, my own and 
yours, and believe that they are the sign of a delightful new 
civlization of man ahead. 
(AP, pp. 39-40) 
There is a sweetness, in that last phrase, and a 'progressivism'?a sense 
that one is going to get somewhere 'ahead'?one does not find usually 
in Olson. But again, it's of use to recognize that the 'history' of The 
Maximus Poems is initial tracking ("mapping," as he would call it) and 
is as much the form of the agent (the person acquiring the 'history,' in 
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this case Olson) as it is the events and/or persons so examined. Lest one 
presume that is an extraordinary distortion of 'the facts,' that is, some 
body of information that might be 'objectively' the case, remember that 
any response to and/or statement of such data will presume a context 
and a meaning. It is the false face of the 'objective' or the 'general' or 
the 'abstract' that Olson finds comtemptible, as in "Letter for Mel 
ville"?"written to be read AWAY FROM the Melville Society's "One 
Hundredth Birthday Party" for MOBY DICK at Williams College, 
Labor Day Weekend, Sept. 2?4, 1951": 
Timed in such a way to avoid him, to see 
he gets a lot of lip (who hung in a huge jaw) 
and no service at all (none o? this chicken, he 
who is beyond that sort of recall, beyond 
any modern highway (which would have saved him 
from sciatica? well, that 
we cannot do for him but we can 
we now know so much, we can make clear 
how he erred, how, in other ways 
?we have made such studies and 
we permit ourselves to think?they 
allow us to tell each other how wise 
he was 
(AM, np) 
As though one could tidy up the real, or find another place for it, or 
understand it 
apart from its enactment. 
. . . 
Possibly the most active rehearsal of Olson's "methodology" is "A 
Bibliography on America for Ed Dorn" (AP, pp. 3-14), which George 
Butterick has called "a fusion of Whitehead's notion of process with an 
Herodotean sense of history. ..." It was written in January 1955 as a 
letter?actually two letters?to the poet Edward Dorn, then a student 
at Black Mountain College. ..." (AP, p. 31, n.) The qualification there 
of person is very useful. In fact, the "Working premises" given at the 
outset should make much clear: 
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are not the same as either 
time as history or as the 
individual as 
single 
(AP, p. 3) 
Results, as of historical study: 
(a) it is not how much one knows but in what field of 
context it is retained, and used (millennia, & quantity) 
(b) how, as yourself as individual, you are acquiring & 
using same in acts of form?what use you are making of acquired 
information (person, & process) 
It's Olson's intent in these letters to define both the nature of that 
attention he values, and the method which most proves its use. Because 
he feels it absolutely required that one move beyond any humanistic 
evaluation of data "BECAUSE THE LOCAL AND THE SENTIMEN 
TAL IS HOW HUMANISM COMES HOME TO ROOST IN AMER 
ICA (AP, p. 5)"?as instance, "sociology, without exception, is a lot of 
shit?produced by people who are the most dead of all, history as politics 
or economics each being at least events and laws, not this dreadful beast, 
some 
average and statistic ..." (AP, p. 3) 
In contrast, his proposal is as follows: 
millenia^^^ 
.^ person 
Process ^ ^ ^^" quantity 
Continuing: 
Applying all four of these at 
once (which is what I mean by 
attention), the local loses quaintness by the test of person 
(how good is it for you as you have to be a work of your 
lifetime?); itself as crutch of ambience, by test of ambience 
[to which one might add as plaintive parallel, "how long, oh 
Lord, how long. 
. . 
"] its only interest is as process (say barbed 
wire, as attack on Plains husbandry) or as it may be a sig 
nificant locus of quantity (in America how, say, prairie vil 
lage called Chicago is still, despite itself, a prairie village. 
. . . 
(AP, p. 4) 
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I That millennia: 
& 
II person 
And a little later, same page: 
If, in fact, by person one means "what, in fact, the critter, homo sap, is, 
as we take it, now . . . (AP, p. 6)," then, as Olson says, "our own "life" 
is too serious a concern for us to be parlayed forward by literary 
antecedence. In other words, "culture," no matter how great ..." "So 
far as 
"scholarship" might, it will disclose the intimate connection 
between person-as-continuation-of-millenia-by-acts-of-imagination-as 
arising-directly-from-fierce-penetration-of-all-past-persons, places, things 
and actions-as-data (objects)?not by fiction to fiction?" (AP, p. 7). 
There follows, at this point, a lovely homage to Alfred North 
Whitehead, who is then used to define the principle at work here?"we 
should start from the notion of actuality as in its essence a process" 
(Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas p. 355) . . . (AP, p. 8). 
I think I 
might, more responsibly, now enter this discussion as a person, 
literally?and not as a commentator, editor, scholar, or however one 
may care to qualify what has been said thus far. Just as Olson had said 
to Ed Dorn, "Best thing to do is to dig one thing or place or man until you 
yourself know more about that than is possible to any other man . . . ," 
for me the crux was to be "the NARRATOR IN, the total IN to the 
above total OUT ["what I call DOCUMENT simply to emphasize that 
the events alone do the 
work"], total speculation as against the half 
management, half interpretation, the narrator taking on himself the job 
of 
making clear by way of his own person that life is preoccupation with 
itself, taking up the push of his own single intelligence to make it, to 
be?by his conjectures?so powerful inside the story that he makes the 
story swing on him, his eye the eye of nature INSIDE (as is the same 
eye, outside) a light-maker (HU, p. 127)." Always in my own situation, 
there was tacit fear some essential information was lacking, that one was 
dumb, in some crucial sense, left out of the 'larger picture.' So that this 
possibility, as a method, was extraordinarily moving to me insofar as it 
exchanged a concept of social limit (again 'culture,' in its most perni 
cious sense) for the active potential and authority of a human life, lives, 
literally being lived. I had known, certainly, what Olson elsewhere 
proposes as "There are no hierarchies, no infinite, no such many as mass, 
there are 
only/eyes in all heads,/to be looked out of (MP, p. 29)" So too, 
in somewhat parallel sense, Pound's insistence: "What thou lov'st well 
shall not be reft from thee/What thou lov'st well is thy true heritage 
. . 
." (Pisan Cantos, p. 99). But the condition, the law, so to speak, of this 
situation I took time to trust. 
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Why? That question seems to me intimately involved with all the 
familiar senses of enclosure and self-limit, what Louis Zukofsky wryly 
put as "born very young into a world already very old. ..." It is hard 
to 
change the system, like they say?the more so, paradoxically, when 
it is, by virtue of consciousness, so very simple to. Think of what's 
become of the various significant patterns of "history" even in our own 
lifetime. But my point is really that significant aspects of Charles 
Olson's thought and work have been confusing to its critics insofar as 
the model of 'world' in mind, in each case, was very different, if not 
altogether antithetical. In short, there is often a disposition to read The 
Maximus Poems as if they were a symbolic representation of the forces 
of history, in the abstract, and that the unremitting emphasis upon "the 
facts," as he would say, whether of dreams or Gloucester records or his 
own daily existence, are somehow there to 'describe' or otherwise 'stand 
for' a 
'reality' of general kind. They are not. Let me, in fact, make an 
absolute emphasis: they are not. 
No, the "cause" is otherwise, "It is the cause the cause, still, it is (and 
she, still/even though the method be/new, be/the rods and cones of a 
pigeon's or, a rabbit's/eye, or be/who, man, is that woman you now 
dream of, who/woman, is that man. ..." ("by 3/6/51" AOM, np.) In 
his lecture at the Berkeley Poetry Conference (July 20, 1965), Olson 
makes the point very flatly, "You're simply stuck with the original 
visionary experience of having been you, which is a hell of a thing. 
[Laughter] And, in fact, I assume that the epigraph that I've offered today 
is my only way of supporting that, which is [he writes on the board]: 
that which exists through itself is what is called meaning. ..." (CM, p. 11) 
I believe there's simply ourselves, and where we are has a 
particularity which we'd better use because that's about all 
we got. Otherwise we're running around looking for some 
body else's stuff. But that particularity is as great as numbers 
are in arithmetic. The literal is the same as the numeral to 
me. I mean the literal is an invention of language and power 
the same as numbers. And so there is no other culture. There 
is 
simply the literal essence and exactitude of your own 
. . . 
Truth lies solely in what you do with it. And that means you. 
I don't think there's any such thing as a creature of culture 
. . . The radical of action lies in finding out how organized 
40 
things are genuine, are initial, to come back to that statement 
I hope I succeeded in making about the imago mundi. That that's 
initial in any of us. We have our picture of the world and 
that's the creation. 
(CM, p. 36) 
There is, finally, a late text ("Gloucester, 28 Fort Square Feb. 15th 
(LXIX)'MP, p. 76) which makes an intensive compact of a great range 
of Olson's thinking, and since one cannot, responsibly, undertake all the 
materials and situations of his work in such 
"working notes" as these, 
let it serve as center for our own ending here. (Regretfully, in some 
respects, since much dear to my own heart, "Apollonius of Tyana," for 
example, or the specific relations with Jung, Corbin, and that primary 
man, Alfred North Whitehead, have barely been touched upon, if at all. 
But one takes heart in Whitehead's insistence, dear indeed to Olson: 
"There is 
nothing in the real world which is merely an inert fact. Every 
reality is there for feeling: it promotes feeling; and it is felt." 
(Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 439) So we won't miss 'it' insofar as 
it is 
'here.') 
The text, then, is "The Animate Versus the Mechanical, And Thought" 
(AP, p. 74 ff.) He begins, "Gravity, in fact, but pre- or post-mechanics. 
That is, not effect (Newtonian) nor proof (Recent) but experiential: 
phenomenological, perceptional, actionable" (AP, p. 74). In short, that 
this fact of being, in any given instance, not be taken outside, so to speak, 
but be recognized as the "Dogmatic Nature of Experience" (cf. P&T, 
p. 44), which it is. He notes the situation of a plant, which "has at the 
tips of its leaves and the ends of its roots "standing-growing-responding" 
actions . . . and has, if and as 'weight,' gravitational 'history.' 
In fact 
'history,' as, in that sense, difference from "astrono 
my" [which relies, perforce, on 'mechanical' measure]: that 
event (in Merleau-Ponty 's sense [cf. O, p. 3, pp. 44-50]? 
narrative) is a perceptual?that wld be primordial?element of 
experience so much so that it 'carries' through-out the sys 
tem?the system being 'Creation'?as 'element' (or 'weight') 
as profound as any mechanically measurable or demonstrable 
'truth'; that even in short?or here decisively 'history' ?as 
must [as necessity, as what has to happen]?is a condition of 
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organism. (Above 'Animate.') . . . now I am proposing an 
even more fundamental 
'tropism' ["Tropism, I think, is actu 
ally the riddler of the lot. Or it's the management, or it's the 
manueverer, or it's then . . . it's ourselves." P&T, p. 43]: that 
one cannot 'think' even?because one cannot 'act' even? 
without such limits as the 'lines' of being, both in the plant 
and the animal 
'meaning,' 'animate' 
... So I am back to 
animate, plant-or-animal?'perception' sense?of the fresh 
ness in time of the narrative or history as a tone or mode and 
so activeness of, for a human being, 'Creation': that there is 
no 
'knowledge' of the crucial (axial-tropistic) sense of any 
thing, including the "Universe" or the "Self," except by this 
'Time' phenomenon of freshness which Animateness, in and 
by itself, as initial of experience. 
(AP, p. 74) 
You will recall the frequency with which Olson quoted Heraclitus, 
'Man stands estranged from that with which he is most familiar'? 
literally, that fact, that living organism, of him/herself, and the crisis, 
persistently, in the situation is that all else is affected by such a powerful 
'unit of meaning' so intensively awry. It is as if we have entered the 
'inside' of this animate 'content' with the same terms of measure and 
their related agency, the mechanical, with which we had presumed our 
mastery over the 'outside,' that "geography" also so insistently present 
and which "forever . . . leans in/on me ... ." (MP, IV, V, VI, np). In 
contradiction, Olson proposes: 
The animate?plant or animal?is the aboriginal instance of 
our occurence and is therefore the aboriginal condition which 
qualifies?defines both in fact and act, including the form 
making usefulness of?our action. 
The import of this can be quickly stated: man as Love (plant, 
heliogeotropic) grows up and down, man as separateness (ani 
mal) disposes of himself by sitio?chooses his place but which 
even though it gives him freedom disposes him likewise by 
gravity (statolith)?starch, turgor?'weight'-of-mass)?equal 
tropistically. Heaven and Earth. , ? _,x v y (AP, pp. 75-76)* 
*Turgor: "The normal fullness or tension produced by the fluid content of blood vessels, 
capillaries, and plant or animal cells." Statolith: "A small, moveable concretion of calcium 
carbonate, found in statocysts." Statocyst: "A small organ of balance in many invertebrates, 
consisting of a fluid-filled sac containing statoliths that help indicate position when the animal 
moves." (American Heritage Dictionary) 
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What's to be made ofthat, with that, is all that any human life or the 
acts that make it life can constitute: 
an actual earth of value to 
construct one, from rhythm to 
image, and image is knowing, and 
knowing, Confucius says, brings one 
to the goal: nothing is possible without 
doing it. It is where the test lies, maigre 
all the thought and all the pell-mell of 
proposing it. Or thinking it out or living it 
ahead of time. 
(MP, Vol. Three, p. 190) 
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